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Abstract: 
 
 
This paper considers two societal concerns in addition to health maximisation: first, 
concerns for the societal value of lifetime health for an individual; and second, 
concerns for the value of lifetime health across individuals. Health-related social 
welfare functions (HRSWFs) have addressed only the second concern. We propose a 
model that expresses the former in a metric – the adult healthy-year equivalent 
(AHYE) – that can be incorporated into standard HRSWFs. An empirical study based 
on this formulation shows that both factors matter: health losses in childhood are 
weighted more heavily than losses in adulthood and respondents wish to reduce 
inequalities in AHYEs. 
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1. Aims and Background: 
 
Publicly funded health care systems aim to maximise population health (e.g. as 
measured in terms of Quality Adjusted Life Years, QALYs), and to account for 
inequalities in health.  An analytical tool that can be used to balance the possibly 
conflicting objectives is the health related social welfare function (HRSWF), 
defined as a function of population health.  Dolan et al (2005) suggest that the 
public are sensitive to issues beyond the expected health benefit of an 
intervention when asked about how society should allocate healthcare resources.  
In particular, the general public takes account of: age or the timing of illness 
within lifetime health (Busschbach et al, 1993; Mooney et al, 1995; Rodriguez et 
al, 2000); the severity of ill health and potential for health benefits (Nord, 1993, 
1995, 1999; Nord et al, 1999; Ubel, 1999); individual characteristics and life 
circumstances, including individual responsibility (Charny et al, 1989; Dolan et al, 
1999; Ratcliffe, 2000; Ubel et al, 2001; Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2009); and 
differences in the lifetime health of groups (Johannesson and Gerdtham, 1996; 
Lindholm et al, 1996; Lindholm and Måns Rosén, 1998; Andersson and Lyttkens, 
1999). 
 
These factors can be grouped into two different kinds.  Factors of the first kind 
affect the societal value of lifetime health within a person.  Two lifetime health 
profiles made up with the same amount of total QALYs may be valued differently 
by society if the distribution of ill health across the lifetime is not the same: for 
example, a QALY loss resulting from severe ill health during childhood may be 
regarded differently from the same QALY loss during adulthood; or permanent 
mild disability may be regarded differently from a short-lasting severe condition 
with the same QALY loss.  In other words, these factors affect the levels of 
lifetime health that appear as arguments in the HRSWF.  Factors of the second 
kind affect how society aggregates lifetime health across people.  So, the same 
amount of health across people may add up to different levels of social welfare 
depending on how inequality averse is the HRSWF.  
 
In this paper, we concentrate on two factors (quality of life and the timing) that 
appear within an “adult healthy year equivalent” (AHYE) and one factor 
(inequality aversion) that appears as standard SWF parameter.  The AHYE 
captures the societal value of a health profile in terms of an equivalent number of 
years in full health to an adult. AHYEs are a more general form of QALYs: only 
when every quality of life ‘time slice’ is weighed equally will AHYEs reduce to 
QALYs.  
 
Suppose there are two interventions: Intervention 1 gives a 10 year old 1 QALY 
over 5 years, and Intervention 2 gives an 80 year old 2 QALYs over 5 years.  
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Both are expected to live for another 5 years with or without treatment and die.  
Since (as a matter of positive description) Intervention 2 generates twice as 
much health measured in QALYs, standard QALY analysis will say Intervention 2 
is twice as effective as Intervention 1.  There are two separate things that can be 
considered.  First, assume now that the societal value of 1 QALY of health varies 
by age of the patient such that a QALY to an adolescent is twice as valuable as a 
QALY to an adult.  This would mean that a QALY to a teenager is equivalent to 2 
AHYEs.  I f so, then the two interventions will be equally effective in terms of 
AHYEs.   Second, assume instead that there is inequality aversion over lifetime 
health.  To the extent that the 10 year old patient is expected to have a lower 
level of lifetime health compared to the 80-year old, the 1 QALY gained by the 
former may be valued more highly than the 2 QALYs gained by the latter.  In 
reality, either or both of these considerations may hold.  At the conceptual level, 
these two are independent of each other, but at the empirical level, it may not be 
straightforward to distinguish between them. 
 
 
2. The Adult Healthy Year Equivalent and the SWF 
 
Whereas the QALY is measured as a sum of health over time, the AHYE is 
derived as a sum of weighted health over time. That is, the number of AHYEs to 
a group i, or iv , is given by: 
∑∞
=
=
1
),(
t
iti thVv , 
where V  is a weighting function based on health-related quality of life ( ith ) of 
group i at time t and timing ( t ), where V  increases in health ( 0>
itdh
dV ). Here, 
health states worse than dead can be considered so long as each group receives 
positive lifetime health ( 0>iv ). We further assume that iv  is multiplicatively 
separable into health and timing components so that: 
∑∞
=
=
1
)()(
t
iti tThfv ,   0>itdh
df
, 0)( >tT . 
 
This equation allows us to asses the lifetime health of individuals in terms of 
AHYEs if we can estimate a relationship for f and T. In the study reported here, 
dichotomous variables were used to represent both relationships. Given such a 
relationship we could compare the lifetime health of individuals, and hence 
consider the trade-offs that society is willing to make between individuals in a 
lifetime health-based SWF. 
 
The AHYE used here employs dichotomous variables for timing (representing 
health experienced up to or after 18 years of age), and severity/quality of life at 
0 (equivalent to dead), 0.25 or 1.00 (full health). AHYEs are defined as weighted 
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sum over five variables, and for simplicity these are combined into a vector y i =  
( iby ,00.1, , iby ,25.0, , iby ,0, , iBy ,00.1, , iBy ,25.0, )', where iHby ,,  is the time spent in 
health state H as a child by group i, and iHBy ,,  the time spent in health state H 
as an adult by group i. The weights on these parameters for state H are given by 
Hb  and HB  during childhood and adulthood, respectively. For comparability with 
the QALY, the adult dead and full health states are given are weighted at 0 and 1 
respectively ( 100.1 =B  and 00 =B ). In general the number of AHYEs can be 
written as: 
iBiBibibibii yByybybybv ,25.0,25.0,00.1,,0,0,25.0,25.0,00.1,00.1)( ++++=y   
(Eq. 1) 
 
Where multiplicative separability holds, the number of AHYEs becomes: 
iBiBibibii yByyBbybv ,25.0,25.0,00.1,,25.0,25.000.1,00.1,00.1 )()( +++=y  
 (Eq. 2) 
 
In order to model the sensitivity in social preferences to lifetime health 
differences, we assume that those preferences can be represented by a constant 
elasticity of substitution SWF over AHYE-defined lifetime health. This general type 
of SWF has been used before but with life years (Williams, 1997; Dolan et al, 
2002), healthy life years (Lindholm and Måns Rosén, 1998) or QALYs (Williams, 
1997) as its metric. In a two-group case where each group is equally sized and 
made up of homogeneous individuals (in health, at least), the SWF is:  
 W =  [ ] r1−−− + rr vv 21 5.05.0 ,     0\),1[ ∞−∈r  
Where W is social welfare and r  reflects the overall strength of inequality 
aversion. 
 
Here, the inequality aversion parameter ( r ) reflects the degree to which society 
values a more equal distribution of health vis-à-vis maximising health. As citizens, 
people might be concerned only about average lifetime health ( 1−=r ), only 
concerned about the health of the worst off group ( ∞→r ) or, more realistically, 
concerned about both average health and inequalities ( 1−>r ). Since the SWF is 
homothetic, the size of r relates to sensitivity to the relative differences in lifetime 
health. The SWF found here seeks to estimate both the AHYE and inequality 
aversion parameters simultaneously, and does so by finding a best fit solution in 
which multiplicative separability holds. 
 
3. Framework of analysis 
 
In brief, our method: 1) uses pairwise social preferences over states of the world 
representing the lifetime health for two homogeneous groups; 2) analyses these 
preferences to find states with equal social welfare using Thurstone scores; 3) 
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takes points with equal social welfare to allow us to fit parameters to a non-linear 
SWF to find a best-fit model satisfying the multiplicative separability assumption.; 
4) parameterises uncertainty using bootstrapping. We do not claim that our 
methods are the only possible of resolving parameterising the SWB but our aim 
was to establish the tractability of this issue and provide results for a given, and 
actually quite generalisable, set of methods. 
 
3.1. Identifying points with equal social welfare 
 
The SWF for each state of the world (x) is defined using the number of AHYEs 
each group receive, which are themselves an as-yet-undefined function of the 
lifetime health profiles of two equally sized and homogenous groups; for 
simplicity, we denote this asx  =  {y1; y2} . (Whilst only two groups are used in 
this study, there is no restriction on the number of groups that can be 
incorporated.) “Choice sets” are defined by comparing pairs of states (sets of 
lifetime health profiles) against each other, with each choice set having one 
consistent “study state” x0 against a series of four “reference states” x1 to x4. 
 
The reference states are constructed to be collinear (see Figure 1) with higher 
index numbers referring to worse states (e.g. 4321 xxxx fff ) so long as all 
years spent in states better than dead are valued positively (or not too 
negatively) at a societal level. We use this ordering to infer preferences between 
the reference states and reduce the burden on respondents relative to the case 
in which all states would be compared to each other. 
 
Figure 1: Reference and study states. 
 
 
Group 1 health (y1)
Group 2 health (y1)
45º
x1
x2
x3
x4 x0
 
0
~x
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Our method is based on Case V Thurstone scores (Thurstone, 1927a, 1927b) and 
provides cardinal scale values for the social welfare of each state at the 
aggregate level across respondents. This method uses comparisons of all states 
against all other states, and where extreme preferences are found for one state 
over another, these values are typically censored to fall within a set range, since 
unanimity will cause indeterminacy. The typical response to this issue is either to 
omit such data or restrict proportions to fall within a permitted range (Guildord, 
1954; Edwards, 1957) and we use a range of 2%-98% in our main analysis.  
 
We use data for the all possible comparisons of the five states; thus 25 
comparisons in total. 16 preferences are inferred using the relationships between 
the reference states: “better” states receive ),( ji xxρ = 0.98, “worse” states 
receive ),( ji xxρ = 0.02, and ),( ii xxρ = 0.50 where a state is compared 
against itself. Of the remaining nine comparisons, we have four comparisons of 
the study state against reference states, another four for the reference states 
against the study state (since ),( ji xxρ =1 - ),( ij xxρ ), and one comparison 
of the study state against itself. Therefore, for each choice set we only need to 
elicit the four pairwise choices of the study state against the reference states. 
 
The Thurstone scores assume an underlying random utility model in which x i is 
preferred to x j where the assessment of social welfare for the former exceeds 
that for the latter ( )( iW x > )( jW x ). The scores assume that each of these 
social welfare assessments is independently drawn from normal distributions with 
a common variance. The larger is the mean social welfare assessment for a state 
( iW ), the more often we would expect ix  to be preferred against the other 
states. Let ),( ji xxρ  be the average proportion of the time that ix is preferred 
to jx  (indifference scored as a “half” preference to each option): 
∫∞
−
−
=
),(
2
1 2
2
),(
ji
t
z
ji dt
xx
xx e
pi
ρ  
 
Here, each ),( jiz xx  value is a function of the difference in social welfare 
between the states and the average of all the ),( jiz xx  values for ix  gives a 
cardinally measurable estimate of iW . With estimates for the study state and 
each of the reference states, we know where the study state falls in an ordered 
list of all the reference states. Further, since the social welfare estimates are 
cardinally measurable, we can estimate a “new” state ( 0~x ) with the same social 
welfare value ( 0W ) as the study state: 
230
32
30~ xxx
WW
WW
−
−+=  
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3.2. Finding the SWF parameters 
 
The process of deriving parameter estimates in the SWF uses these societally-
equivalent states ( 0x , 0~x ). These equivalent states should have the same 
estimated social welfare. Given a set of candidate parameters for the SWF, we 
interpret any difference in estimated social welfares between states as an error, 
and the sum of squared errors as an estimate of goodness of fit. By varying the 
SWF parameters we seek to minimise these errors and find a best fit. 
 
As above, an AHYE-based SWF allows social preferences to be interpreted in 
different ways.  In the introduction, we gave the example in which a QALY gain 
to a 10 year old was deemed to be twice as valuable as a QALY gain to an 80 
year old. Here, if the QALY and AHYE gains coincide ( 00.1b = 1, 25.0B = 0.25), this 
general preference suggests some weighting to reducing inequalities ( 1ˆ −>r ).  
However, if childhood health was deemed to be twice as valuable as adult health 
( 00.1b = 2, 25.0B = 0.25), we could explain this preference with a sum-ranking 
function ( 1−=r ). For intermediate cases (1 < 00.1b < 2), we would expect some 
weight on reducing inequalities but not as much as in the case where no 
differential timing of ill health occurs ( 1ˆ −>> rr ). 
 
The relationships between parameters cause a specific computational problem. 
Suppose we have start with the r that would best represent inequality aversion in 
a QALY-based SWF (i.e. the 00.1b = 1, 25.0B = 0.25 case). Increasing r further 
suggests that society is more inequality averse, and this will be consistent with 
the data only if there is less relative difference between the scenarios when using 
AHYEs than when using QALYs. With less inequality in SWF terms, there is less 
potential for differences between the social welfare estimates of indifferent 
states, and hence lower total sums of squared errors for a best fit solution 
(conditioned on r) as inequality aversion increases. Minimising the sum of square 
errors across all parameters (including r) does not lead to convergence. Instead, 
at each stage we estimate best fit solutions for the AHYE parameters ( 00.1b , 25.0b , 
and 25.0B ) conditional on r without requiring multiplicative separability (using 
Equation 1). ( 0b  is not estimated as all individuals survive into adulthood in our 
questions – given multiplicative separability is imposed, 0b = 00.1b × 0B = 0.)  
 
Formally, we find best fit estimates for parameter values conditioned on 
inequality aversion and estimate the deviation from multiplicative separability 
within these estimates ( 25.025.000.1 bBb −× ). By varying inequality aversion, we 
can find the best fit solution satisfying multiplicative separability. This provides 
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estimates for both parameter values and inequality aversion parameters – and 
hence a version of the SWF that separates out the societal measurement of 
lifetime health from preferences for equality across these societal measurements. 
 
 
4. Methods 
 
The overall research project assessed the relative health gains to different 
beneficiaries using a SWF framework slightly more general than the one used 
here. The project considered both other types of weighting and additional levels 
that are not reported here given space constraints and our stated aim of finding 
feasibility. The main project report is available, as is a general summary of the 
SWF findings (Dolan et al, 2008a, 2008b). 
 
Recruitment: 
 
Interviewing was conducted by the Centre for Research and Evaluation at 
Sheffield Hallam University within England and Wales. Seventeen areas were 
isolated and sampled to obtain a mixture of gender, age and education. 
Interviewers visited these areas and knocked on doors to obtain participants who 
had been informed previously by letter about the study. The sampling frame 
aimed to recruit a minimum number of people in categories defined by gender, 
age, and education.  
 
Materials: 
 
The main study carried out face-to-face interviews that took place at the 
respondent’s home. This comprised a self-completion “beliefs” questionnaire (not 
reported here); a brief introduction to NICE, the need for decision making and 
priority setting, and the concept of quality of life; followed by the main pairwise 
choice task. The interview elicited responses for 64 questions in 16 choice sets, 
of which four choice sets are reported here. 
 
The early choice sets in the project dealt with choices in which all life years were 
lived in 100% health until death. By presenting respondents with questions that 
did not involve illness, the aim was to provide respondents some general 
familiarity with the task and question format. Following 16 choices (four sets) of 
this type, the questions considered here were introduced. In these questions, 
individuals live either in poor (25%) health or full (100%) health. 
 
Table 1 gives the reference states for the four choice sets considered here. These 
reference states in these questions are collinear; in addition, there is the same 
difference in AHYE terms between 1x  and 2x  as between 2x  and 4x , and the 
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same difference in AHYE terms between 2x  and 3x  as between 3x  and 4x . 
The study states that are compared against the reference states appear in the 
lower half of the table. In all four choice sets, the study states involve more 
inequality in health (in QALY terms) than in the reference states. 
 
Table 1: Reference States ( 1x  to 4x )  and Study States ( 0x )  
Reference States Group 1 Health Group 2 Health 
1x  62 years full health 
16 years poor health 
60 years full health 
8 years poor health 
2x  60 years full health 
8 years poor health 
56 years full health 
8 years poor health 
3x  59 years full health 
4 years poor health 
54 years full health 
8 years poor health 
4x  58 years full health 
 
52 years full health 
8 years poor health 
 
Study States ( 0x )  Group 1 Health Group 2 Health 
Choice Set 1 66 years full health 
8 years poor health 
50 years full health 
16 years poor health 
Choice Set 2 66 years full health 
16 years poor health 
4 years poor health 
54 years full health 
4 years poor health 
Choice Set 3 72 years full health 
16 years poor health 
48 years full health 
16 years poor health 
Choice Set 4 8 years poor health 
72 years full health 
8 years poor health 
48 years full health 
16 years poor health 
 
In the description of the health states, poor health was identified as a 0.250 (or 
25%) quality of life. Four years in health of 0.250 was explained to the 
respondent as being worth 1 year in health of 1.000 health to the individual 
experiencing it, so that the 25% applies as an individual (rather than a societal) 
judgement. These questions are used to find weights given for childhood versus 
adult health, 25% health versus 100% health, and a value of r.  
 
The choices were presented in a mixed text/graphics format, with the information 
also read out to respondents. Respondents were initially told that the 
consequences of health decisions could affect the distribution of health and at 
each choice were asked “Which scenario would you prefer NICE to bring about?” 
Responses could indicate a preference for either option or indifference (“I  don’t 
mind if it’s X or Y”). 
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Analysis: 
 
In Figure 2, the reference state 2x  (labelled “X”) is compared against the study 
state 0x  (labelled “Y”). In Scenario X, Group 1 receives 60 years in full health 
followed by 8 years in poor (25%) health, whilst Group 2 receives 56 years in full 
health followed by 8 years in poor (25%) health. This is compared to Scenario Y 
in which Group 1 receives six more years in full health, and where Group 2 
receives 6 years less in full health and 8 more years in poor health. In QALY 
terms, Group 1 obtains 6 more QALYs and Group 2 obtains 4 fewer QALYs by 
choosing Y over X. (In AHYE terms, this trade-off may vary but will still probably 
favour Y on efficiency grounds and X on equality grounds.) 
 
Figure 2: Sample Choice -  reference state 2x  against 0x  in Choice Set 1 
 
 
In order to identify trade-offs, Thurstone-equivalent states ( 0~x ) were found for 
each of the four choice sets and parameters for AHYEs and inequality aversion (r) 
derived using Microsoft Excel. The trade-offs between the states were computed 
in both AHYE and QALY terms. 
 
As these methods above provides only point estimates, we use bootstrapping 
(sampling with replacement) to analyse uncertainties. Assuming that the data are 
representative of the underlying uncertainty, bootstrapping allows the 
construction of additional samples of the same size as the original sample. By re-
running the analysis on these samples it is possible to estimate a distribution for 
each parameter. This distribution allows us to gauge the extent of uncertainty in 
the point estimate of each parameter. In this way, we can address the non-
methodological uncertainties of our estimates. As the number of values necessary 
to provide a convergent estimate for uncertainty is unknown, the analysis here 
uses n=5000 bootstrapped observations in order to find convergence. 
 
X
Gro up 1:
60 yea rs full hea lth
8 ye a rs po o r he alth 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Gro up 2:
56 yea rs full hea lth
8 ye a rs po o r he alth 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Y
Gro up 2:
50 yea rs full hea lth
16 yea rs po o r he alth 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Gro up 1:
66 yea rs full hea lth
8 ye a rs po o r he alth 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
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5. Results 
 
Within the main study, 582 interviews were conducted by nine interviewers, of 
which 559 had complete data across all 16 choice sets. I t was
 
not possible to 
compute a response rate, since the number of doors knocked on and the number 
of individuals asked to participate was not recorded. Whilst we selected a range 
of geographical locations, our emphasis was to obtain a sample across the range 
of gender, age, and education and not necessarily to aim for a representative 
sample of the general population. 
 
Table 2 presents the background of our sample, and it is clear that through our 
sampling frame we over-sampled the retired and those aged over 60, and under-
sampled those with an education to a high school level only relative to the 2001 
census. The sample also contains a smaller number of individuals in employment 
and in ethnic minorities. The interview took an average of 55 minutes to 
complete. 
 
Table 2: Background of the sample 
Sample size  Social QALY 
sample (%) 
2001 Census 
(%) 
Gender:  Female 55 52 
40-59 32 33 Age: 
60+  32 27 
Ethnicity White 95 92a 
Self-employed 7 8 
Other Employed 39 52 
Employment 
status: 
Retired 29 14 
School only 47 78a Education: 
HE/FE 53 22a 
House ownership: Owned/mortgage 71 71bc 
a
 Ages 16-74 only 
b
 2000 data. Office of National Statistics. 
 
Table 3 shows the proportion of the 559 respondents with complete data that 
prefer the study state ( 0x ) to the reference states ( 1x  to 4x ). As expected, the 
study state is preferred more often as we move from the best reference state 
( 1x ) to the worst reference state ( 4x ). There appears to be a relatively large 
spread of individual preferences, however, with 35% of preferences preferring 
the study state to the best reference state, and nearly 50% preferring the study 
state to the worst reference state.  
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Table 3: Preference for study states over reference states ( ),( 10 +lxxρ )  
 
0x  
preferred 
to 1x  
0x  
preferred 
to 2x  
0x  
preferred 
to 3x  
0x  
preferred 
to 4x  
Choice Set 1 37% 38% 42% 48% 
Choice Set 2 43% 46% 47% 52% 
Choice Set 3 36% 38% 43% 47% 
Choice Set 4 39% 43% 46% 50% 
Cells show ),( 0 ixxρ . 
Individual indifference is scored as a 50% preference. 
 
Table 4 shows both the study states ( 0x ) and their estimated equivalent states 
( 0~x ) derived from the Thurstone scores in each choice set. Within each of the 
equivalent states, ill-health always occurs at the end of life so, for instance, the 
equivalent state in Choice Set 1 involves 59.23 years of full health, followed by 
4.92 years in severe health. The tables show the difference between the study 
and equivalent states 1) as QALY differences and 2) as AHYE differences (using 
Table 5 estimates). Moving from the study state to the equivalent state in all four 
choice sets would involve a greater trade-off from the healthier Group 1 to the 
less healthy Group 2. By definition, social welfare is unaffected by all four moves, 
and on both metrics there appears to be inequality aversion. 
 
Table 4: Study and equivalent points, plus trade-offs between them 
Choice Set 1  
 Group 1 Health Group 2 Health 
0x  66 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
50 years in 100% health 
16 years in 25% health 
0
~x  59.23 years in 100% health 
4.92 years in 25% health 
54.46 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
QALY differences -7.54 QALYs +2.46 QALYs 
AHYE differences -7.60 AHYEs +2.31 AHYEs 
 
Choice Set 2  
 Group 1 Health Group 2 Health 
0x  66 years in 100% health 
16 years in 25% health 
4 years in 25% health 
54 years in 100% health 
4 years in 25% health 
0
~x  59.40 years in 100% health 
5.61 years in 25% health 
54.81 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
QALY differences -9.19 QALYs +0.81 QALYs 
AHYE differences -9.38 AHYEs +3.23 QALYs 
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Choice Set 3  
 Group 1 Health Group 2 Health 
0x  72 years in 100% health 
16 years in 25% health 
48 years in 100% health 
16 years in 25% health 
0
~x  59.23 years in 100% health 
4.92 years in 25% health 
54.46 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
QALY differences -15.54 QALYs +4.46 QALYs 
AHYE differences -15.74 AHYEs +4.31 QALYs 
 
Choice Set 4  
 Group 1 Health Group 2 Health 
0x  8 years in 25% health 
72 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
48 years in 100% health 
16 years in 25% health 
0
~x  59.34 years in 100% health 
5.34 years in 25% health 
54.67 years in 100% health 
8 years in 25% health 
QALY differences -15.33 QALYs +4.67 QALYs 
AHYE differences -10.67 AHYEs +4.53 QALYs 
 
Estimates for the AHYE and r parameters are obtained using these study and 
equivalent states and using the methods above. In testing, it appeared that only 
a single solution satisfying multiplicative separability ( )(rk =  0) appears to exist 
for each sample. Table 5 presents our estimates for the AHYE parameters with 
the uncertainty figures obtained by bootstrapping. 
 
Table 5: AHYE parameters and r 
  
Study 
Estimates 
Standard 
Deviation 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Adult, 1.00 health 00.1B  1.000 - - 
Adult, 0.25 health 25.0B  0.268 0.012 ( 0.244, 0.292) 
Child, 1.00 health 00.1b  1.828 0.031 ( 1.768, 1.888) 
Child, 0.25 health 25.0b  0.490 0.027 ( 0.439, 0.542) 
Estimates based on 5000 bootstrapped observations 
 
In the AHYE, 25% health as an adult ( 25.0B ) is worth 0.268 of the value attached 
to a year of full health, as against 0.250 in the QALY. This is not significantly 
different, however (95% CI: 0.244, 0.292). Under standard QALY calculations 3 
years of 25% health to an adult who otherwise would have died and one year of 
improvement from 25% health to full health for an adult are both worth 
0.75QALYs.  Using AHYEs, the former will be 0.804 AHYEs and the later is worth 
0.732 AHYEs, suggesting that the AHYE might justify only a premium of 10% for 
severity (as poor quality of life) over the standard QALY calculations 
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In contrast, the AHYE gives a significantly higher weight to the health that we 
experience as children than does the QALY. Here, a year of full health received as 
a child ( 00.1b ) receives an 83% higher weight (1.828) than full health received as 
an adult (1.000). Likewise (by multiplicative separability), a year of 25% health 
as a child receives the same premium over a year of 25% health as an adult 
(0.490 versus 0.268). 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
In this paper, we consider two concerns regarding the societal value of health 
that have been conflated in previous work. The first is a social concern for how 
an individual’s lifetime health is comprised: the same number of QALYs may have 
a different social value if when those QALYs are experienced differs e.g. ill health 
in childhood may be weighted more highly than similar ill health in adulthood, 
holding everything else constant. The second is a social concern for the 
distribution of health across people. The former issue affects the arguments of 
the social welfare function, whilst the latter issue affects the function itself 
through changes in its parameters. 
 
Our analysis is novel in that we measure social preferences over the former in 
terms of adult healthy-year equivalents. The closest alternative to our approach 
was in Bleichrodt et al (2004), where an application of the rank-dependent model 
found an approximately linear function for the value of a QALY between the ages 
of 10 and 40, and suggesting that those in worse health (according to ranking) 
received greater weight in the social value of a QALY. 
 
Inevitably, our approach has required certain assumptions in order to obtain 
data.  Whilst we do not believe that these assumptions are unreasonable, several 
could be relaxed e.g. we rely on assumptions for preferences between the 
reference states that could be tested; we consider states that occupy the same 
“neighbourhood” of a constant elasticity of substitution SWF; this functional form 
is problematic when extended to consider those expected to receive very little 
lifetime health. However, these are issues that can be addressed in further 
analysis of the current data and future studies. Our experimental design was also 
influenced by the need to be relatively robust to a range of possible preferences, 
rather than efficiency in identifying specific parameter values; again, this might 
be addressed in subsequent studies. 
 
Existing literature has argued that the values placed on health benefits differ 
according to other characteristics beyond just the length and quality of life 
included in the QALY. According to such a view, the QALY might be expanded to 
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include additional dimensions or – as in the current study – replaced by an 
alternative metric. I t also suggests that the period of life up until 18 years of age 
contributes a higher proportion of our lifetime health than would be explained 
simply summing the number of QALYs received. There is also weak evidence that 
a QALY gained by giving a person four more years in 0.25 health may be worth 
more than giving the same person one more year in full health. Per QALY, this 
suggests that treatments moving people from extremely poor health to moderate 
health may be more valuable than those moving people from moderate to good 
health, or good to very good health. As expected, we also find that society places 
a premium on those treatments that reduce inequalities in lifetime health across 
groups. 
 
By distinguishing between different types of possible reasoning, this study has 
aimed to provide novel insight into how social preferences can be more 
accurately represented within a SWF. More widely, our study suggests that 
attempts to place differential weights on certain QALYs should be treated with 
caution.  Our framework suggests that a societal preference could be interpreted 
in different ways.  For example, inequality aversion could be thought to suggest 
prioritising those groups in society who receive less lifetime health, whilst strong 
non-QALY reasoning in what constitutes health could be thought to suggest 
prioritising treatments for particular diseases (e.g. those that reduce childhood 
health, or that have more severe health consequences). As the interpretation of 
societal preferences will affect the policy recommendations that can be drawn 
from them, we require robust methods to analyse such preferences. To this end, 
we believe that this paper may provide a useful step forwards both in 
encouraging debate and in presenting a novel empirical approach.  
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